This paper examines the effects of early childhood nutrition on schooling inputs and outcomes to assess the dynamic nature of human capital production, using panel data from South Africa. Height-for-age Z-score is used as a measure of health and nutritional status in early childhood. Based on a comparison of siblings, this analysis concludes that improving children's health significantly lowers the age when they start school, increases grade attainment, and decreases grade repetition in the early stage of schooling.
Motivations
Human capital takes a long time to accumulate, going through multiple phases from early childhood through higher education. While nutritional intake in early childhood forms the basis of a child's health capital, which provides a foundation for subsequent child development, 1 investments in schooling augment the child's knowledge capital, which is directly rewarded in advanced labor markets and technologies. In this paper, we examine the effects of nutritional status and health capital in early childhood on schooling investments and outcomes, using recently available panel data from South
Africa.
The dynamic process of human capital development creates the possibility that investments in early childhood will influence the optimal amount and effectiveness of investments at later stages (Cunha et al. 2004) . Some recent studies attempt to identify the causality from early-childhood nutritional status to schooling outcomes (see, for example, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2002; Glewwe, Jacoby, and King 2001). In general, the way that early-stage human capital investments determine the subsequent path of human capital accumulation and future income depends on (1) whether investments in different stages are mutual complements or substitutes, and (2) the extent to which early investments and outcomes alter the environment, information, and preferences of children and parents that affect investment decisions at later stages.
To answer the question of whether early investments in children affect future outcomes requires a good understanding of rather complex interactions of market forces and dynamic household behavior. First, health capital, as well as schooling investments, generates positive economic returns, especially in the developing-country context (Strauss 1986; Haddad and Bouis 1991; Thomas and Strauss 1997) . Therefore, health capital may increase opportunity costs for schooling investments, 2 and it may affect intertemporal decisionmaking, creating nonlinearity in the effect of health capital on schooling investments.
Second, there is a technical relationship between health and schooling in the dynamic human capital production function. For example, if health capital 3 is an input in the schooling production function (for example, enabling children to attend classes every day), whether health capital augment the productivity of schooling investments or it substitutes for schooling inputs, it affects the optimal level of schooling investments. In the former case, we predict a cumulative process of widening inequality among siblings,
given differences in nutritional status and health capital in early childhood, since more knowledge capital is invested in healthy children. If parents are averse to sibling inequality in the future earnings, they will make more schooling investment in unhealthy children.
Third, parents also learn about potential returns to schooling investments from outcomes of early-stage investments (in nutritional status and health in our context) and make decisions regarding optimal investments at later stages. In these decisions, parents' preferences concerning sibling inequality in human capital and future income matter. If parents are averse to the inequality among their children, they may increase investments in schooling of their less well-endowed children to equalize future incomes among their children (Quisumbing, Estudillo, and Otsuka 2003) . In the context of dynamic human capital production, since outcomes of early-childhood investments signal the expected outcomes of investment at a later stage, parents can react to those signals by changing late-stage investments to maximize their objective.
To empirically assess this issue, we encounter a few challenging problems even with longitudinal data of children. The first problem arises from potential endogeneity of nutritional status, such as fixed household-specific unobserved factors that affect both child health capital and schooling decisions, creating a positive correlation between them.
To eliminate this problem, our approach requires household fixed effects, which base inferences on (often small) sibling variations.
5
The next section describes the model. Human capital accumulation is modeled as a sequential process in which health is formed at an early stage and schooling investment is undertaken given the health outcomes. Both health and knowledge (education) capital determine earnings in the labor market. Section 3 discusses econometric issues, focusing on specification and identification strategy.
Data and variables are described in Section 4. To measure schooling outcomes,
we use the 2004 KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (Round 3), which collected individual-level information such as enrollment, age schooling started, grade completed, grades repeated, and expenditures from children aged 7 to 20. To supplement the main analysis, the survey also used the results of simple mathematics tests given to children 4 The literature offers a few qualified empirical studies, which solve the above problems. Using longitudinal data for children from Zimbabwe, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2002) use civil war and drought periods that affected growth in children below three years to identify the effect of early childhood malnutrition on schooling in a maternal fixed effect model. This identification strategy is based on findings that income shocks, such as drought and flood, in credit constrained circumstances, change consumption, which affects child growth (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001; Foster 1995) . Glewwe, Jacoby, and King (2001) take a similar approach to sibling estimation, using longitudinal data of Filipino children, but their identification strategy uses a rather strong assumption on height changes among older and younger siblings. Alderman et al. (2000) use price data, interacted with parents' education and child gender, as instruments for child height growth in Pakistan. 5 An earlier version uses the unique period in South Africa from the end of apartheid to the beginning of a democratic regime in the province of KwaZulu Natal. The country introduced the first democratic election in 1994, but the implementation of the local election was delayed one year in KwaZulu-Natal due to violent political conflicts and social turmoil. This period is also the start of widening economic and political opportunities for African populations, who were neglected during apartheid. These transitions seem to have exogenously affected the welfare of sample households, though the magnitude and direction of the changes depend on the community in which they resided as well as their initial income level. The sample of children in the longitudinal data from the province of KwaZulu Natal include children below the age of three in 1994 and 1995, whose physical growth is regarded as sensitive to nutrition intakes. However, it is shown that the instruments constructed are not statistically effective enough to correct for individual bias.
age 7 to 9 to measure their learning performance. Therefore, combined with the information on nutrition and health outcomes for children ages 1 to 5 available in the 1998 survey, we can investigate the effect of early childhood nutrition on schooling investments and outcomes of children 6 years and above. One advantage of focusing on early stages of schooling is the high enrollment rate at the primary school level, which minimizes a selectivity problem arising from child time allocation decisions at later stages of schooling.
Section 5 summarizes empirical results. First, data for siblings showing the effects of nutrition (as indicated by height) on the age schooling started and the grade completed show that for the majority, children of normal height (as measured by heightfor-age Z-score) start school earlier, complete more grades, and repeat fewer grades. The analysis also identifies some outlying observations among taller children (less than 5 percent of the sample) that show a negative effect of the height Z-score on schooling outcomes. In the analysis with longer panel data (11 years), we find that, although better nutrition and health status in early childhood improves primary school outcomes, this positive effect diminishes as the child moves from primary to secondary school.
Second, the analysis on mathematics test results, using the sample of children age 7 to 9, shows that health capital, measured by height at early childhood, has a significantly positive effect among children age 7, implying that early-childhood nutrition affects learning performance at the very early stage of transition to schooling.
Comparison of naïve-ordinary least squares (OLS)-and sibling estimates also demonstrates that some (unobserved) household factors improve both child health and learning performance. Similarly, our results suggest that household-specific unobservables are positively correlated with schooling investments and early childhood health capital.
Third, the information on individual-level school fee expenditure enables us to investigate intrahousehold resource allocation among siblings. We find that more resources are allocated to shorter (less healthy) children in the early stage of primary school (thus reducing inequality), but this increases inequality at later stages.
A Simple Model
This section introduces a simple model in which parents decide on how much to invest in child health and schooling, resulting in returns to labor. For simplicity, we treat the age distribution of children as exogenous and assume that children enter the labor market in the final stage. Health is formed in the first stage, 6 while schooling investment is undertaken in the next stage.
In the pre-primary stage, per capita consumption determines health capital hj for child j,
where c 1 is per capita consumption in the household, z is predetermined household characteristics such as parents' schooling, and ε j1 is an idiosyncratic health shock. 
For simplicity, we assume that c 1 = y. Given that h is child height, c is specifically intended to capture nutritional intake.
At the second stage, knowledge capital, k j , accumulates with schooling investments s jt . The law of motion is given as
where investment g(s j2 , h j , z) has health capital as its argument. Complementarity between schooling and health investments is captured by 6 Nutrition intakes until the age of 3 are regarded as very important in forming child health capital, measured by height-for-age Z-score. Although weight-for-age Z-score fluctuates over time (age) due to changes in nutrition intakes (that is, consumption), height-for-age Z-score is less likely to change after the age of 3. In the context of dynamic human capital production, therefore, child health is measured by the height-for-age Z-score. It is also important to note that the income opportunity in the child wage w(h) is not necessarily related to labor markets. It may also capture activities such as childcare and self-employment in a family business.
Parents maximize the objective function, Cunha et al. (2004) summarize some key concepts in the sequential development of child human capital. They focus on cognitive and noncognitive development. It seems that their analysis does not directly include health and nutritional status as part of human capital in child development. The exclusion of health capital from the analysis results in a framework in which they can focus on human capital production function and complementarity and substitutability of different inputs (early childhood and schooling stage). In this paper, children also work in the labor market where health capital has economic returns.
which captures the discounted sum of expected utilities from consumption over time and the final-period returns from children. Assume that W (k i , h i ) is strictly concave in both k i and h i . The concavity of the wage function implies that parents have incentives to equalize human capital among their children.
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The first order conditions at the second stage are
where λ 2 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the stage-2 budget constraint.
These conditions provide the schooling function k*(y, h j , z). At the first stage, the problem is trivial, since exogenous income and shocks determine investment in health capital. From these conditions, we define
The first term captures the expected marginal return from schooling investment, while the second term is the opportunity cost for time spent in school. Therefore, with a perfect loan market, the effect of health on schooling depends on
Therefore, preference does not actually enter the condition. In this case, parents compare returns and opportunity costs for schooling, and child health capital can change both. Household income does not enter the condition, so income level does not affect the optimal schooling and child health does not affect the schooling decision.
8 Since household members have no preference for leisure, there is no income effect on labor supply.
If child wage does not increase with health capital (that is, w′(h) = 0), an increase in health capital will raise the optimal level of schooling if health and knowledge capital are complementary.
Consider the case that b = 0, where credit opportunity is closed. Given the second-order condition, the effect of h j on s j depends on
The right-hand side captures changes in the opportunity cost and the current liquidity.
First, an increase in health capital raises the child wage, which discourages schooling investment. Second, an increase in health capital relaxes the current budget constraint,
given that the child works to make a contribution to the household income. The concavity of the utility function guarantees that the second term is negative, which increases schooling investments.
9 An increase in the income level decreases the marginal utility, so λ 2 (y). In the first term, poverty therefore magnifies the negative effect of health capital on schooling investment. If the absolute risk aversion measure is constant, it is easy to show that an increase in income weakens the negative effect of health capital on child schooling. 9 An increase in child health capital improves the welfare:
where the Envelope theorem was applied to the third term. Even though we cannot predict the direction of the marginal impact of changes in health capital on schooling investments, it is shown that the direct effect of an increase in health capital is welfare augmenting.
Interestingly, the effect of other siblings' health capital on schooling investment only exists when the financial market is imperfect. An improvement in other siblings' health relaxes the budget constraint, which reduces the marginal utility λ 2 (y). This does not happen when the loan market is perfect.
We have two conjectures. First, in the case of the convex return function where the second order conditions do not hold, we expect some corner solutions, concentrating all schooling investments in some children, leaving no investment to others. Parents can maximize welfare by investing in some children, while ignoring the others. When health capital is complementary to schooling investment, parents concentrate schooling investments in well-endowed children, if the labor market wage is constant. However, greater health capital also raises wages (thus, opportunity costs), which decreases schooling investments. If the latter effect is sufficiently small, we expect that the inequality in schooling between siblings will diverge.
Empirical Framework
To assess the effects of children's health in their early years on schooling decisions and outcomes at a subsequent stage, we use the following framework. The schooling equation is
where i, j, and t denote household, child, and time, respectively, and q ijt is schooling inputs or outcomes, h ijt−1 is health capital, which is measured by the height-for-age Zscore (formed at t − 1), a ijt is the age of the child, z ijt is a set of control variables, μ i is household-specific fixed unobservables, φ j is child-specific fixed unobservables, and ε ijt is an error term.
First, it is important to control the heterogeneity that arises from the current ages.
For example, cumulative years of grades repeated increases (but weakly) as children spend more time in school, that is, as their age increases. The score of the mathematical tests also changes by age (and grade completed). In the analysis below, we assume that age structure in the sample of children is exogenous; it is uncorrelated with shocks in schooling decisions and outcomes, which justifies the inclusion of age fixed effects.
Second, since it is highly likely that household-specific unobservables μ i are correlated with h ijt−1 , ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of β 1 are biased. This makes it necessary to eliminate this component from the errors. For this purpose, we include household fixed effects to control μ i . Therefore, estimation is based on variations across siblings in the household.
In the context of panel analysis, the inclusion of household fixed effects has another advantage regarding the attrition bias, which may arise from endogenous migration and mortality during the sample period. Since we only look at variations within households, given household observations in the two rounds, we do not have to control for household-level attrition problems. Individual-level attritions are investigated in Section 4.
Third, even with household fixed effects, we still encounter a potential problem of bias that may arise from a correlation between φ j and h ijt−1 . To wipe out this correlation, it is necessary to use a set of instruments that explains the variations in h ijt−1 but is uncorrelated with either φ j or shocks in schooling investments and outcomes ε ijt .
However, the necessity depends on the magnitude of covariations in differences among siblings in Z-score and schooling endowments.
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Finally, we can examine how parents differentiate among their children in the quality of their investments in school fee payments. It is thought that options depend on income level. Low-income households, most likely to be credit constrained, cannot afford to change expenditures for different siblings. Children from those households are likely to attend inexpensive public schools in the neighborhood. An increase in income enables parents to differentiate between their children in school spending. In this regard, it is interesting to see whether parents compensate for less endowed children (those with 12 The instruments used in the analysis below are influenced by a historical event specific to KwaZuluNatal, from which our data come. Prior to 1994, under apartheid, South Africa prohibited freedom in various dimensions of social life for African and nonwhite populations. At the end of apartheid in 1994, after violent political struggles, the country held its first democratic national election, except in KwaZuluNatal, where the African National Congress and a new political party could not agree to the election. For this reason, KwaZulu Natal had its election one year later in 1995. That year was marked by turbulence and violence in the province. An instrument is constructed to have the value of one if children were less than 3 years old (inclusive) between the beginning of 1994 and the end of 1995. Before the age of three is regarded as the period when the child's growth is most sensitive to nutritional intake, which reflects economic conditions. This indicator is interacted with cluster fixed effects to capture possible heterogeneity in the impacts of the 1994-95 disturbances on child growth, I(Age ≤ 3 in Year = 1994 or 95) × cluster indicators. This period also corresponds to the abolishment of apartheid, so new economic opportunities became open to the African population. Thus there may have been positive impacts as well as negative ones. In addition, to capture the heterogeneity in the impacts related to the initial income level, the indicator is also interacted with total monthly household income in 1993.
Although an F-test supports the joint significance of these instruments in explaining variations among siblings in height-for-age Z-scores, a Hausman-Wu test rejects the relevance of these instruments. We observed some differences between sibling OLS and sibling IV estimates, but the magnitude did not change the qualitative nature of our results. Therefore, we do not show sibling IV estimates here and focus on sibling OLS estimates in the following discussion. lower health capital) by spending more on them, or whether they will or concentrate more resources on better-endowed children.
Data
The analysis requires information from different points in time for the same individuals. In this paper, we use data from the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study In the main analysis, we use as schooling variables: (1) age started school, (2) grade completed (conditional on current age), (3) the number of grades repeated, (4) school fee expenditure, and (5) 14 In the main analysis, we only use observations with estimated age started school greater or equal to age 4, restricting the sample to children who were aged less than 3. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of schooling outcome variables: age started school, the highest grade completed, and the cumulative number of grades repeated. First, the age started school increases as the current age increases, which suggests that younger cohorts enter school at an earlier age. Second, the highest grade completed and the cumulative number of grades repeated also increase with the current age. Figure 2 also depicts the distribution of individual-level school fee payment. It is highly skewed, with a concentration of low school fee expenditures.
In the mathematical tests, we implemented four types of numerical tests for children age 7 to 9-summation, subtraction, multiplication, and division. The four questions are 3 + 5 (summation), 7 − 3 (subtraction), 2 × 6 (product), and 12 ÷ 4 (division). Table 2 reports observations with correct and incorrect answers. Note that the sample size for each age group is nearly the same. First, the likelihood of giving a correct answer increases as age increases for all four questions. Second, the difficulty increases as we move from summation to division. Table 3 reports the determinants of attritions from the 1998 to the 2004 rounds.
Since our main analysis focuses on variations among siblings, controlling for household fixed effects, attritions at the individual level are of interest. Given observations in the 1998 round, our concern here is to determine whether the probability of being observed in the 2004 round depends on explanatory variables used in the schooling investment and outcome equations. The sample is restricted to children from households found in 2004 who were between the ages of 1 and 5 in 1998 with values of height-for-age Z-scores between -6 and 6,.,.
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Specifications include household fixed effects with initial age and gender indicators. Columns 1 and 2 use household fixed effects based on the 1998 and 2004 15 In the analysis of nutrition-height effects on schooling, we screen out observations of children that show inconsistent ages in the two rounds (for example, age 6 in 2004 corresponds to age 0 or 1). In the analysis of age started school, we exclude those who were already enrolled in 1998. Mostly for the first reason, sample size differs between the above attrition analysis and schooling analysis. Screening observations of inconsistent ages between 1998 and 2004 based on the 2004 survey excludes large height-for-age Z-scores due to understated age in 1998. depends on the age of the child. Columns 3 and 4 include the interactions of Z-scores and age in 1998, which again shows that even in each age group, height does not affect the attrition probability. Since age is controlled as a fixed effect in schooling equations, estimation of equation (1) is robust to attrition bias. Similarly, Columns 5 and 6 examine attritions from 1993 to 2004. Results confirm that attritions were not associated with height-for-age Z-score in 1993 (and interactions with the 1993 age), so we do not have to control attrition probability in the following analyses.
Outcomes at the Early Stage of Schooling
Age Started School Table 4 shows the effect of the height-for-age Z-score in 1998 on the age started school. The sample consists of children aged 1 to 3 in 1998. 16 Column 1 controls only cluster-level fixed effects, while column 2 reports estimates for siblings. The specifications include current age indicators to control cohort effects. In column 1, greater child height is found to significantly lower the age when the child started school, though this estimate is likely to be biased due to a correlation between household-level factors and child height. Table 5 reports the effects of the height-for-age Z-score on years of schooling completed. Columns 1 and 2 compare estimates with cluster and household fixed effects.
Grade Completed
Though a positive significant effect is found with cluster fixed effects, the effect is negative and insignificant with household fixed effects. In both cases, girls are more likely to advance grades than boys.
To check possible nonmonotonicity, columns 3 and 4 include step functions of height-for-age Z-score in different ranges. Interestingly, an improvement in the height Zscore significantly increases years of schooling completed, but the effect turns out to be negative at large values of the Z-score.
The negative effect of height on schooling is consistent with increased opportunity cost of schooling investment. However, we also have to take into account the possibility that those observations with large Z-scores come from an understatement of ages. As discussed, the number of observations in this range of Z-scores is extremely small.
17 A preliminary analysis showed some potential nonmonotonicity in the effect of the height Z-score on age started school. First, estimates of height effects on age started school are significantly negative among relatively short children. Marginal gain in earlier age to start school from increasing height is greater among less endowed children. Second, the numbers of observations in these estimations suggest that the effect is negative and significant in more than 95 percent of the sample. Some outlying observations from exceptionally tall children (conditional on age) change the estimates. This also holds in the analysis of grade completion and repetitions. Sample consists of children aged 1 to 5 in 1998, consistent with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Zscore in the range of -6 to 6 in 1998.
The results also show that household endowment is negatively correlated with height if the Z-score is smaller than one, but it is positively correlated with height if the score is larger. If the negative effect of height on schooling attainment comes from the incentive to work outside school, unobserved household-specific factors (such as parents' knowledge) tend to prevent children from supplying their labor. Table 6 summarizes the results on grade repetitions. The dependent variable is the cumulative number of grades repeated. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates with cluster and household fixed effects respectively. The effect of the height Z-score is insignificant in both cases. Consistent with the previous finding on grades completed, girls experience a smaller number of grade repetitions than boys.
Grade Repetition
Columns 3 and 4 include step functions of the height Z-score to capture possible nonlinearity. Though nonmonotonicity is not detected statistically in the case of cluster fixed effects, sibling estimation demonstrates convexity. For those who are relatively stunted, an improvement in height Z-score reduces grade repetitions, but this effect becomes positive among relatively tall children. Again, as in the discussion of grades completed, this result can be consistent with both increased opportunity costs of schooling investment and possibly understated ages among them. Sample consists of children aged 1 to 5, consistent with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Z-score in the range of -6 to 6 in 1998.
Column 5 uses the rate of grade repetition as the dependent variable for checking whether the above finding results from an understatement of age. The rate of repetition is constructed as the cumulative number of repeated grades divided by the sum of grades repeated and completed. Those who show height-for-age Z-scores above the value of one are found to experience greater repetition rates, which supports the possibility that opportunity costs can be high among them. Table 7 shows the results on school fee expenditures. In addition to the heightfor-age Z-score, we include its interaction with total monthly household income in 1998. 18 In column 1, which controls for cluster fixed effects, the 1998 household total monthly income has a positive and significant effect on school fee payment. The effects of the Z-score and its interaction with the initial household income are both insignificant.
School Fee Expenditure
Relatively wealthy households are able to pay more for school fees within clusters.
Column 2 shows the sibling estimates. The specification includes the interaction between the height Z-score and household income in 1998. Since the estimation is based on household variations of the height Z-score, the 1998 household income is exogenous.
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While the height Z-score has a positive (marginally significant) effect on school fee expenditure, higher household income is found to reduce this effect so that parents spend more for relatively short children only if they can afford it. The former effect (height) increases income inequality among siblings (given positive returns to height in the labor market), while the latter (higher income) reduces inequality among them.
To detect possible nonmonotonicity, column 3 includes step functions of the height-for-age Z-score. Except for some significant effects from scores of between 3 and 4, the finding remains robust. Note that less than 5 percent of the full sample had a Zscore greater than 3. 18 In preliminary analyses, height-for-age Z-score in sibling estimation was insignificant without its interaction with the 1998 total household income, no matter what range of Z-score was used. Therefore, it is important to control heterogeneity of the initial income level. 19 In a preliminary analysis, the 2004 household monthly income was also interacted with the height Zscore in 1998, but it was shown to be insignificant. consists of children aged 1 to 5 in 1998, consistent with 2004 ages, height-for-age Z-score in the range of -6 to 6 in 1998, and school fee paid is less than or equal to school fee charged.
Learning Outcomes
Tables 8a and 8b report the effects of height for age on mathematics test scores.
In the 2004 survey, we implemented four types of basic mathematics tests for children aged 7 to 9. There are four questions, one question for each operation: 3 + 5 (summation), 7 -3 (subtraction), 2 × 6 (product), and 12 ÷ 4 (division Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values, using robust standard errors. Table 8a shows Probit results with cluster fixed effects. There are two observations. First, significantly positive effects are found in summation and subtraction (relatively easy computations). The point estimate decreases as the difficulty of calculation advances. Second, age has a significantly positive effect on the probability of answering correctly. These estimates are again likely to be biased due to omitted household factors. that in summation and subtraction, height Z-score significantly increases the probability of making correct answers among children age 7, but not in the other age groups.
Interestingly, the effects will decrease as children age. The lagged nutrition effect is significant in the transitional phase from pre-primary to primary school stages.
Outcomes at the Later Stage of Schooling
This section summarizes our findings on the effects of the children's height Zscore in 1993 on schooling outcomes in 2004. Before discussing the results, we also must note that South African education was in its historical transition from apartheid to democracy during the period 1993-96, and the South African School Act and Norms and Standards were introduced in 1996, making it compulsory for the school system to be nonsegregated. Due to these social changes, it is also expected that the estimation results are subject to imprecision.
It is also important to note that by 2004, this group of children was also in transition from primary to secondary stages of education. This may create heterogeneity by age in the effects of the height Z-score on schooling outcomes. Therefore, it is equally important to examine possible variations in the height effect by age as well as the 21 The finding implies that household factors are positively correlated with both child height and learning outcomes (both conditional on age).
nonmonotonicity. The role of positive returns to health is greater among elder children than younger.
In the analysis of age started school results in Table 9 , we expect more measurement errors than is the case in the 1998 sample due to recall problems. Columns 1 and 2 show sibling estimates (household fixed effect). The height Z-score has no significant effect on age started school in this group. Column 3, which uses cluster fixed effects instead of household fixed effects, shows that a greater height Z-score decreases the age they started school for those in the age-14 group (compared with the age-11 group), who were already age 3 in 1993 (before the political transition). All these results
show that girls are likely to start school earlier than boys. Sample consists of children aged 0 to 5, consistent with 2004 ages, and height-for-age Z-score in the range of -6 to 6 in 1993. Table 10 shows the effects of the height-for-age Z-score on grades completed and repeated. All the specifications control household fixed effects. Column 1 has only the height Z-score, which shows its insignificance. Age heterogeneity is controlled in column 2. It is interesting to know that an improvement in height Z-score marginally increases years of schooling completed, but it is likely to decrease grades completed as they age (conditional on age). It is possible that greater health capital may discourage further schooling from primary to secondary stages, given the positive returns to health in the labor market. To confirm the robustness of this finding, column 3 includes step functions of the height Z-score. Contrary to the previous findings for younger children (and cohorts), nonlinearity is not found in the highest grade completed. Columns 4 to 6 report on grade repetition. In Column 5, similar to the results on grade completion, the height Z-score has a negative effect on the age 11 group, but the effect is positive among older groups. This finding suggests that (conditional on age) greater health capital may discourage further investments in schooling at the transition stage from primary to secondary schools. Column 6 investigates potential nonlinearity by introducing step functions, which again show insignificance of nonlinearity in grade repetition.
In both grades completed and repeated, girls perform better than boys. However, preliminary analysis shows that gender does not matter in the effect of the height Z-score on these schooling outcomes.
Finally, Table 11 reports the effects of the height Z-score on school fee payment.
Interestingly, the results show opposite signs in the key parameter estimates. Columns 1 and 2 use monthly household income in 1993 and 2004, respectively. In both cases, the height Z-score decreases the school fee paid, while an increase in income augments school-fee expenditure to healthy children. The difference between Tables 11 and 7 may result from (1) possible differences in the education system that these cohorts experienced during this transitional stage of South African education, (2) differences in parents' attitude to school fee expenditure and school choice behavior between early primary school and primary-to-secondary school stages. However, the results show a with 2004 ages, height-for-age Z-score in the range of -6 to 6 in 1993, and school fee paid less than or equal to school fee charged.
process of increasing inequality among children, given positive returns to health capital and the positive association between school fee expenditure and school quality.
Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of early childhood health capital on schooling investments and outcomes, using panel data from South Africa. Good nutrition and health in early childhood are thought to be a precondition for child development and school learning at subsequent stages. However, in an environment where children may contribute to household income, as in developing countries where health capital has positive economic returns in the labor market, child health augments not only the efficiency of human capital production at the schooling stage but also the labor-market wage. Therefore the opportunity costs of going to school are higher.
Nutrition intake and health capital in early childhood, measured by the height-forage Z-score of pre-primary-school-aged children, enhance schooling investments and improve the outcomes. That is, children who are well nourished and in good health start school at an earlier age, progress further, and repeat fewer grades. We also found that some taller children (Z-score above two) perform worse than shorter children, but since this segment of observations is very small in our sample, it is difficult to generalize this nonmonotonicity. Instead, the analysis with a longer panel data of 11 years suggests that good health may discourage further investments in schooling at the stage of transition from primary to secondary school, when a better health status may reinforce incentives to go to work. In the early stage of schooling, parents attempt to narrow the gaps in total human capital and future incomes among siblings by increasing expenditures on education for children with smaller health capital as household income increases.
However, unequal allocation of resources among siblings is found to increase inequality at later stages. This difference may reflect some changes in the education system in South Africa during this period, or changes in parents' behavior that may happen when the child moves from primary to secondary school.
